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Abstract. We perform a multi-scale impact assessment of
tephra fallout and dispersal from explosive volcanic activity
in Iceland. A companion paper (Biass et al., 2014; “A multi-
scale risk assessment of tephra fallout and airborne concen-
tration from multiple Icelandic volcanoes – Part I: hazard
assessment”) introduces a multi-scale probabilistic assess-
ment of tephra hazard based on selected eruptive scenarios
at four Icelandic volcanoes (Hekla, Askja, Eyjafjallajökull
and Katla) and presents probabilistic hazard maps for tephra
accumulation in Iceland and tephra dispersal across Europe.
Here, we present the associated vulnerability and impact as-
sessment that describes the importance of single features at
national and European levels and considers several vulnera-
bility indicators for tephra dispersal and deposition. At the
national scale, we focus on physical, systemic and economic
vulnerability of Iceland to tephra fallout, whereas at the Eu-
ropean scale we focus on the systemic vulnerability of the air
trafﬁc system to tephra dispersal. This is the ﬁrst vulnerabil-
ity and impact assessment analysis of this type and, although
it does not include all the aspects of physical and systemic
vulnerability, it allows for identifying areas on which further
speciﬁc analysis should be performed. Results include vul-
nerability maps for Iceland and European airspace and allow
for the qualitative identiﬁcation of the impacts at both scales
inthecaseofaneruptionoccurring.Mapsproducedatthena-
tionalscaleshowthattephraaccumulationassociatedwithall
eruptive scenarios considered can disrupt the main electricity
network, in particular in relation to an eruption of Askja. Re-
sults also show that several power plants would be affected if
an eruption occurred at Hekla, Askja or Katla, causing a sub-
stantial systemic impact due to their importance for the Ice-
landic economy. Moreover, the Askja and Katla eruptive sce-
narios considered could have substantial impacts on agricul-
tural activities (crops and pastures). At the European scale,
eruptive scenarios at Askja and Katla are likely to affect Eu-
ropean airspace, having substantial impacts, in particular, in
the Keﬂavík and London ﬂight information regions (FIRs),
but also at FIRs above France, Germany and Scandinavia.
Impacts would be particularly intense in the case of long-
lasting activity at Katla. The occurrence of eruptive scenarios
atHeklaislikelytoproducehighimpactsatKeﬂavíkFIRand
London FIRs, and, in the case of higher magnitude, can also
impact France’s FIRs. Results could support land use and
emergency planning at the national level and risk manage-
ment strategies of the European air trafﬁc system. Although
we focus on Iceland, the proposed methodology could be
applied to other active volcanic areas, enhancing the long-
termtephrariskmanagement.Moreover,theoutcomesofthis
work pose the basis for quantitative analyses of expected im-
pacts and their integration in a multi-risk framework.
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1 Introduction
Tephra dispersal and deposition during explosive volcanic
eruptions can produce impacts at different scales, from local
to continental. Compared to other volcanic hazards, tephra
fallout is unlikely to cause casualties, but, nonetheless, it of-
ten produces high systemic and socioeconomic impacts (e.g.,
Wardman et al., 2012; Biass et al., 2012). Moreover, the pres-
ence of volcanic ash in the atmosphere disrupts aerial navi-
gation and may produce additional socioeconomic impacts
at larger scales, from regional to continental, depending on
the eruption intensity and duration, ash properties and atmo-
spheric circulation. For these reasons a comprehensive risk
assessment of active explosive volcanoes that are located in
areas with high population and ﬂight density should always
include the hazard associated with both tephra dispersal and
accumulation.Icelandisamongstthemostactivevolcanicar-
eas in the world, hosting more than 30 volcanic systems that
display different eruptive styles and a wide range of volcanic
products (Thordarson and Larsen, 2006). In a companion pa-
per, Biass et al. (2014) present a probabilistic tephra haz-
ard assessment from four Icelandic volcanoes (Hekla, Askja,
Katla and Eyjafjallajökull) selected for showing recent ac-
tivity, different levels of historical record, and a variety of
eruptive styles and activities. In this manuscript we present
the associated vulnerability and impact assessment in order
to support more effective mitigation strategies in Iceland and
Europe. As for other natural risks, volcanic risk evaluation
builds upon three factors: hazard, exposure and vulnerabil-
ity (e.g., De la Cruz Reyna and Tilling, 2008). Exposure is
a key element in risk assessment, since it “encompasses all
elements, processes, and subjects that might be affected by
a hazardous event. Consequently, exposure is the presence
of social, economic, environmental or cultural assets in areas
that may be impacted by a hazard” (Birkmann, 2013, p. 305).
Thus, the identiﬁcation of exposed targets largely depends on
their location with respect to the impacted area for the con-
sidered hazard and to the type of hazard at stake. Finally, the
exposure, although crucial for an effective risk assessment,
does not account for the variability of response of people,
infrastructure, goods or ecosystems to the hazardous event:
such response depends on their susceptibility to be harmed
or, in other words, on their vulnerability. Vulnerability can be
deﬁned as the potential of exposed targets to be directly or
indirectly damaged by a given hazard. Deﬁnitions, concep-
tualframeworksandmethodologiesforanalyzingandassess-
ing vulnerability are very heterogeneous, although “there is a
clear recognition of the importance of place-based studies in
examining vulnerability” (Cutter, 2013, p. 1089). In the last
decade, vulnerability has been largely recognized as a multi-
dimensional concept, comprising different aspects (physi-
cal, systemic, social, economic, environmental, institutional,
etc.) constantly interacting in time and space (Birkmann,
2006; Galderisi et al., 2008; UNISDR, 2009; Menoni et al.,
2011). In particular, the concept of systemic vulnerability is
becoming more widespread in the scientiﬁc literature and
refers to the fragilities arising as a consequence of interde-
pendencies among elements and systems within a given ter-
ritory, which can reduce its overall functioning in the face
of a hazardous event (Rashed and Weeks, 2003; Menoni,
2005; Galderisi et al., 2008; Pascale et al., 2010; Ensure,
2011). Territorial systems are characterized by a dense net-
work of physical and functional interdependencies (Paton
and Johnston, 2006; Hellstrom, 2007), and the potential im-
pact of a hazard on a given element may reverberate on to
others that are physically or functionally connected to the
former. The concept of systemic vulnerability has been ap-
plied in several areas of natural hazards such as ﬂoods, earth-
quakes, tsunamis, etc. (e.g., Minciardi et al., 2005; Pascale
et al., 2010), but in volcanology this concept has been in-
troduced only recently (e.g., Galderisi et al., 2013). Sys-
temic vulnerability has a particular relevance in the case of
tephra fallout, which may produce much higher secondary
than primary impacts; that is, the physical failure of an el-
ement may also impact other connected activities and in-
frastructures (Biass et al., 2012). For example, the failure of
the electrical network can cause cascading effects on several
productive activities, such as manufacturing, power gener-
ation, agriculture or tourism. Furthermore, tephra dispersal
and deposition largely affect transportation networks, which
are crucial for accessibility to urban areas and emergency fa-
cilities. Finally, social and economic aspects of vulnerability
have been deepened in scientiﬁc literature since the 1990s,
but an unequivocal deﬁnition of both social and economic
vulnerabilities and of their mutual relationships is still miss-
ing (Parker and Tapsell, 2009; Tapsell et al., 2010). The aim
of this analysis is performing a vulnerability and impact as-
sessment analysis at national and European levels. Due to the
large scale of the analysis and the lack of speciﬁc data, phys-
ical vulnerability is not considered in our assessment, with
the exception of few speciﬁc elements of particular relevance
(i.e., electric power plants and distribution network). A com-
prehensiveassessmentofphysicalvulnerabilityisbeyondthe
scope of this paper. Moreover, we consider only one aspect
of the systemic vulnerability, i.e., the a priori identiﬁcation
of elements and systems that are particularly relevant from
a systemic point of view. We do not account for the cascad-
ing effects and spatial interdependences that may take place
during the emergency. Through this simpliﬁed approach, the
vulnerability and impact assessment presented here aims at
identifying the areas that are likely to suffer the higher im-
pacts, where more speciﬁc research should be performed.
This approach is commonly adopted in risk management for
hazardous phenomena whose physical impact on elements
are not yet quantiﬁed, and in particular for those which do
not cause large losses of life and socioeconomic impacts
(Douglas, 2007). Iceland is considered a well-prepared and
highly resilient country, but the traditional risk management
strategies of the Icelandic Civil Protection have traditionally
focused on the short-term reaction rather than on long-term
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land use planning (Jóhannesdóttir and Gísladóttir, 2010). As
a consequence, there is a lack of speciﬁc studies on vulner-
ability of the Icelandic territory to tephra deposition, even
though tephra fallout is a relatively frequent phenomenon in
Iceland. Here we perform a vulnerability assessment taking
into account that, according to the analysis of past events
(Biass et al., 2014), agriculture, transportation and energy
sectors are the most vulnerable to tephra accumulation. We
focus on systemic and economic dimensions of vulnerability.
To this aim, we deﬁne exposed targets, estimate vulnerability
for each considered target, and evaluate the expected impacts
for all the eruptive scenarios deﬁned in the previous hazard
assessment. Physical vulnerability of buildings is not con-
sidered because, according to the hazard analysis of Biass
et al. (2014), expected tephra accumulations are unlikely
to cause signiﬁcant damage to buildings for the volcanoes
and activity scenarios considered (proximal areas around the
selected volcanoes are mostly uninhabited). Moreover, our
analysis is performed at a national scale (the whole island),
while physical vulnerability assessments require detailed on-
sitesurveys,forexampleonbuildingstock,whichareusually
performed at the local scale. However, we consider physical
vulnerability of the electricity network because its failure can
trigger relevant impacts on the whole of society. We also fo-
cus on the potential for temporary or permanent loss of eco-
nomic activities, which is relevant to the maintenance of the
level of welfare of the population. The disruption of ﬂights
caused by the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull event was economically
signiﬁcant for both Europe and Iceland (Sammonds et al.,
2010; Oxford Economics, 2010; Alexander, 2013). Using the
last 10 years of the ERA-Interim reanalysis data set, Biass
et al. (2014) conclude that the probability of having upper-
troposphere winds blowing towards central and northern Eu-
rope is 6–8%, a value consistent with the 6% found by Sam-
monds et al. (2010). Given the experience from 2010, these
probabilities suggest that assessing the vulnerability of the
European air trafﬁc system to Icelandic ash dispersal is rel-
evant for the management of volcanic risk in civil aviation,
particularly since no vulnerability assessment of any air traf-
ﬁc system speciﬁcally focused on volcanic ash hazard exists.
Wegner and Marsh (2007) and Wilkinson et al. (2001) un-
derlined some relevant aspects of the European air trafﬁc net-
workandshowedthatitisascale-freenetworkhighlyvulner-
able to the disruption of the main hubs. Based on this ﬁnding,
we develop the ﬁrst assessment of vulnerability of the Euro-
pean airspace to tephra dispersal. The analysis is based on
the systemic approach and aims to identify the critical fea-
tures for the system, i.e., the elements that can produce the
highest systemic impacts on the whole European air trafﬁc
system in the case of failure. As we did at the national scale,
we identify the distribution and the features of the exposed
targets and deﬁne vulnerability indicators in order to evalu-
ate the expected impact for the different eruptive scenarios
considered in the hazard assessment.
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Figure1.MapofIceland showingthelocationofthefour volcanoes
considered in the hazard assessment and the main cities and towns.
The administrative units (municipalities) used for the national vul-
nerability analysis are given in the Supplement.
This manuscript is arranged as follows. Section 2
overviews the eruptive scenarios for the selected volcanoes
and the ﬁndings from the hazard assessment of Biass et
al. (2014). Section 3 presents the vulnerability and impact
assessment of tephra fallout at the national scale, and Sect. 4
presents the vulnerability and impact assessment of tephra
dispersal at the European scale. Section 5 discusses the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the proposed methodology
and the future research developments required to improve it.
Finally, Sect. 6 concludes the paper with a summary.
2 Eruptive scenarios and results from the hazard
assessment
A companion paper (Biass et al., 2014) presents a multi-scale
probabilistic tephra hazard assessment for different eruptive
scenarios of four highly active Icelandic volcanoes (Hekla,
Askja, Katla and Eyjafjallajökull; Fig. 1). These four vol-
canoes were selected for their high probabilities of eruption
and/or their high potential impacts, and the associated haz-
ard was assessed for dispersal at both national and European
scale for different scenarios based on the eruptive record (Ta-
ble 1). Scenarios are associated with a volcanic explosivity
index (VEI) as described by Biass et al. (2014). Each sce-
nario was modeled assuming a statistical set of inputs using
TEPHRA (Bonadonna et al., 2005) and FALL3D (Costa et
al., 2006; Folch et al., 2009) models for tephra fallout and
dispersal, respectively. Results of the hazard assessment at
the national scale are probabilistic hazard maps for ground
tephra accumulation. Given the rich historical record and
high knowledge of Icelandic volcanic activity, it is possible
with some volcanoes (e.g., Hekla) to associate scenarios with
a “repose time”, while other volcanoes have a short docu-
mented eruptive history or do not seem to follow evolution
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Table 1. Synthesis of the eruptive scenarios considered in the tephra hazard assessment (Biass et al., 2014). ERS: eruption range scenario;
OES: one-eruption scenario; LLERS: long-lasting eruption range scenario; LLOES: long-lasting one-eruption scenario. Tephra accumulation
and dispersal was assessed for Hekla, Askja and Katla, while for Eyjafjallajökull only tephra accumulation was modeled (Biass et al., 2014).
Volcano Modeling Reference Column VEI Eruption
strategy eruption height (kma.s.l) duration
Eyjafjallajökull LLOES 2010 2.5–7.8 2 40 days
Hekla ERS 2000 16.0–30.0 2 0.5–1h
Hekla ERS 1947 6.0–16.0 3 0.5–1h
Katla LLERS Historical moderate/large 10.0–25.0 – 1–4 days
Askja OES 1875 (C+D phases) 22.8–26.0 5 1h+1.5h (C+D phases)
patterns. Scenarios used in this work are not associated with
a probability of occurrence, due to the high uncertainties of
such an approach. Thus, probabilistic hazard maps represent
the expected situation conditioned to the occurrence of the
scenario, i.e., the probability of having critical tephra load at
a given point if the considered scenario occurs. Probabilistic
hazard maps were computed for tephra load thresholds of 1,
10 and 100kgm2, which correspond to approximately 0.1,
1 and 10cm of accumulation on the ground. At a European
scale, results are probabilistic hazard maps (giving the prob-
ability of “disruption”) for ash mass concentration thresholds
of 2 and 2×10−3 mgm−3. The second value (corresponding
to a negligible mass concentration) was considered in order
to estimate the impact in the case of a zero-ash-tolerance cri-
terion. Moreover, Biass et al. (2014) provide maps of disrup-
tion mean persistence (according to Sulpizio et al., 2012) and
arrival times for the 2mgm−3 concentration threshold. The
main ﬁndings from the hazard assessment are (scenarios and
their acronyms are described in Table 1) as follows:
– A 10-year recurrence rate eruption of Hekla (i.e., Hekla
ERS 2000 type) only produces signiﬁcant tephra ac-
cumulation close to the vent and in the southern part
of Iceland. Ash concentration has a low probability
(< 1%) of exceeding the threshold of 2mgm−3 at any
ﬂight level (FL) in the UK airspace.
– A 100-year recurrence rate eruption of Hekla (i.e.,
HeklaERS1947type)producessubstantialtephraaccu-
mulation in the southeastern part of Iceland. However,
far-range ash concentrations still have low probabilities
(< 5%) of affecting the UK airspace, with concentra-
tions above the 2mgm−3 threshold at any FL.
– A moderate long-lasting basaltic eruption of Katla (i.e.,
Katla LLERS with tephra production over 1–4 days) is
likely to produce substantial tephra deposition in south-
ern Iceland. Ash dispersal has a substantial probabil-
ity of reaching northern Europe, the UK (5–20%) and
central Europe (∼ 5%) with concentrations exceeding
2mgm−3 at any FL.
– An eruption of Askja similar to that of 1875 (i.e., Askja
OES 1875 type) is likely to produce massive tephra de-
position in eastern Iceland. Ash dispersal has a substan-
tial probability of reaching northern Europe, the UK (5–
20%) and central Europe (∼ 5%) with concentrations
exceeding 2mgm−3 at any FL.
– An eruption of Eyjafjallajökull similar to 2010 (i.e., Ey-
jafjallajökull LLOES 2010 type) is likely to produce
moderate tephra accumulation south of the volcanic edi-
ﬁce around the town of Vìk. For computational reasons,
probabilistic approaches to assess the airborne concen-
tration resulting from such a long eruption were not
applied.
Finally, in order to compare the relative impact of the differ-
ent scenarios, one historical eruption was selected for each
volcano for which ash dispersal and atmospheric concen-
trations were assessed using the same wind conditions of
the Eyjafjallajökull 2010 eruption. The selected eruptions
include Hekla 1947, Katla 1918, Eyjafjallajökull 2010 and
Askja 1875. The conclusion is that all eruptive events, if they
were to occur, would likely disrupt the European air trafﬁc,
with the most important perturbations caused by eruptions
like Katla 1918 and Hekla 1947.
3 National-scale vulnerability and impacts
3.1 Exposed targets
Inordertoassessvulnerabilityandestimatepotentialimpacts
of tephra fallout in Iceland, one needs ﬁrst to identify the
“social, economic, environmental or cultural assets in areas
that may be impacted by a hazard” (Birkmann, 2013, p. 305).
The main exposed targets have been identiﬁed based on the
scientiﬁc literature on tephra fallout impacts. In detail, the
exposed targets that we consider are as follows:
1. Population: Iceland has 320000 inhabitants, of which
120000liveinReykjavìk,thecapital.About60%ofthe
total population lives in the so-called Greater Reykjavìk
(Supplement Table S1). Recent trends (Byggdastofnun,
2012) show that the population is growing around the
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capital and in the eastern part of the country, where
tephra fallout has high probabilities of occurrence for
some of the eruption scenarios considered (Biass et al.,
2014). The central part of the island is mostly uninhab-
ited. Approximately one-quarter of the population has
reducedmobility:15%ofinhabitantsareunder10years
old and 9% are over 70 (Statice, 2012). This segment
of the population is potentially more exposed to suffer-
ing respiratory difﬁculties due to the presence of sus-
pended PM10 (Baxter et al., 1983; Horwell and Baxter,
2006). In addition, all of the population is exposed to
indirect impacts due to failure of services (water and
electricity supply, transportation, access to health care).
Data on population for each municipality and percent-
age of exposed people are available in Table S2 in the
Supplement.
2. Emergency facilities, (e.g., hospitals, emergency shel-
ters, police and ﬁre stations): the two main Icelandic
hospitals are located in Reykjavìk, but other hospitals
and local health centers, also considered in our anal-
ysis, exist in relevant towns such as Akureyri, Isafjor-
dur, Nordfjordur and Selfoss. Police and ﬁre stations are
quite well distributed amongst the main towns. Finally,
shelters are usually public buildings located close to ar-
eas of interest (monuments, touristic attractions) and
towns, but for simplicity we only consider schools as
possible shelters.
3. Mobility network (e.g., road network and mobility nodes
such as ports and airports): the road network is di-
rectly exposed to tephra fallout, which may disrupt traf-
ﬁc, reducing the capability of the population to reach
critical facilities and indirectly affecting services and
productive activities. In the absence of a railway net-
work in Iceland, the road network is extremely impor-
tant for internal mobility. A main primary road cir-
cles Iceland along the coast. Disruption of the mobil-
ity network, even if temporary, can trigger relevant cas-
cade effects. Ports are extremely important for the im-
port/export activities in Iceland. In 2006, a total of 6Mt
of freight passed through Icelandic ports, which mainly
export marine products (25%) and import/export “other
goods” (49 and 51%, respectively), including textiles
and manufacturing goods (Statice, 2012). Finally, air-
ports are also important mobility nodes. The main air-
port in Iceland is Keﬂavìk, which accounts for more
than 97 and 99% of international passengers and freight
trafﬁc(Isavia,2012),respectively.Importantairportsfor
domestic routes are Reykjavìk and Akureyri, account-
ing for approximately 25 and 50% of domestic passen-
gers and 47 and 20% of freight (goods and mail), re-
spectively (Isavia, 2012). Other smaller airports, includ-
ing Egilsstadir, account for 12.5% of domestic trafﬁc
of passengers. The volume of the domestic air trafﬁc
is modest (around 800000 passengers per year; Isavia,
2012) but nonetheless important for the national econ-
omy, given the absence of a railway.
4. Electricity network: the electricity network is a criti-
cal infrastructure for economic activities and society in
general. Electricity networks are very vulnerable to vol-
canic fallout (Wilson et al., 2009a, 2011), and conse-
quences of a disruption of power generation and dis-
tribution are potentially dramatic. In Iceland, around
85% of the primary energy is produced domestically
from renewable energy sources. In 2011, electricity
was produced almost entirely from hydroelectric (73%)
and geothermal (27%) plants. More than 30 hydroelec-
tric plants are spread across the country, except in the
southern area of the Vatnajökull ice cap (Icelandic Na-
tional Energy Authority, 2012a), and up to 7 geothermal
plants are located around the capital and in the northeast
(Icelandic National Energy Authority, 2012b). Some of
them are combined heat and power plants, which utilize
geothermal water and steam.
5. Economic activities: the main economic activities in
Iceland are services and industry, which in 2011 em-
ployed 75.7 and 18.4% of the working population,
respectively (Landshagir, 2012). Comparison between
Greater Reykjavìk and other regions shows that ser-
vices in the capital region share a higher percent-
age of employees while industry dominates elsewhere
(Landshagir, 2012). In particular, aluminum smelters
are strategic components of the Icelandic economy,
constituting 37.6% of the total Icelandic exports and
placing the country in the top-20 aluminum-producing
nations worldwide. In 2011, aluminum smelting ac-
counted for approximately 73% of the gross electricity
consumption (Landshagir, 2012).
6. Agriculture: the main agriculture activities are related to
theproductionofwoolandmilk,whichonlyaccountfor
a small percentage of the national GDP (Johánnesson,
2010). The distribution of the main agricultural areas
(extracted from the Corine Land Cover raster map; see
the Supplement Fig. S1) shows that a substantial part of
the island is covered by snow and ice, and the few agri-
cultural areas are barely visible and located in the prox-
imity of main villages and coastal areas. Nevertheless,
agriculture is important for local development, being
the main economic resource for people living in small,
isolated villages. Crops can suffer from short- to long-
term impacts due to tephra accumulation (Wilson et al.,
2009b). Fluoride absorption can impact cattle due to its
toxicity and, unless direct inhalation is not a large con-
cern, its ingestion through plants and water can cause
diseases (Dawson et al., 2010).
7. Water supplies: Tephra fallout can disrupt water sup-
ply networks and water treatment plants (Stewart et al.,
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2006). In Iceland, the areas close to active volcanoes are
not densely populated and the disruption of water sup-
ply in urban areas seems not to be a large issue. How-
ever, tephra fallout can contaminate ground and sur-
face waters, which are in some cases used for domes-
tic/agricultural use (about a 95% of the national wa-
ter consumption relies on high-quality groundwater and
only a 5% on surface water; Gunnarsdóttir, 2012). This
is usually the case for isolated farms, where no ofﬁcial
quality controls are performed and, consequently, more
are exposed to this hazardous phenomenon. Moreover,
farms can suffer the indirect impact of tephra fallout on
livestock, as it can contaminate water used for drinking
(Wilson et al., 2009a; Dawson et al., 2010).
This list of exposed targets is not exhaustive but accounts
for the main aspects generally considered in the literature.
Amongst all these exposed targets, we selected the most sig-
niﬁcant for the national context based on practical consider-
ations and data availability. Figure 2 shows maps of the con-
sidered features, based on several data sources: the national
GIS data set (Landmælingar Islands, 2012), the European
statistics database (Eurostat, 2013) and the Iceland National
Statistics (Statice, 2012). In detail, Fig. 2a shows the loca-
tion of the critical features considered (hospitals and schools
that could be potentially be used as shelters), as well as the
national road network. Our systemic vulnerability analysis
is based on how easy it is for the population to reach crit-
ical facilities using the road network. Figure 2b shows the
location of hydroelectric power plants and the electricity dis-
tribution network. The most densely populated areas and the
main productive activities (aluminum smelters) are also dis-
played on the map. Figure 2c shows the location of mobility
nodes relevant for the Icelandic socioeconomic system. Air-
ports can be directly disrupted not only by tephra fallout but
also by tephra dispersal in the atmosphere, which may cause
airspace closure. Import/export activities at ports and airports
can suffer indirect damage due to the disruption of the road
network, power plants and productive activities.
3.2 Vulnerability assessment
As mentioned, our vulnerability assessment focuses on the
systemic and economic dimensions of vulnerability. This
choice results from numerous factors, related partly to scien-
tiﬁc and methodological aspects, including (i) the low prob-
ability of the exposed population suffering from relevant
structural failure of buildings, and human casualties resulting
from tephra accumulations suggested by the hazard analysis;
(ii) the scale of the vulnerability and impact assessment (i.e.,
the whole country); (iii) the priorities for improving effective
mitigation strategies in Iceland, deﬁned through close coop-
eration between local stakeholders and the Icelandic Civil
Protection; and (iv) the availability of accurate and up-to-
date data. As a result, based on the different categories of
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Figure 2. Exposure maps for (a) the road network and critical in-
frastructures (hospitals, local health care centers and schools, which
can be used as ash shelters); (b) electricity distribution network, hy-
droelectric and geothermal power plants, production sites and main
locations (urban areas); and (c) main transport nodes: ports and
airport.
exposed targets, we deﬁned vulnerability themes and indica-
tors (Table 2), focusing on the following aspects:
– physical vulnerability, limiting the analysis to electric
power plants and distribution networks;
– systemic vulnerability, which refers to the interdepen-
dencies among exposed targets capable of reducing the
overall functioning of the system itself and thus its ca-
pacity to react in the emergency phase following an
event;
– economic vulnerability, which refers to the potential
for temporary or permanent loss of economic activities
and assets which are crucial for the Iceland economy
and, consequently, for the maintenance of the level of
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Table 2. Indicators (and estimators) deﬁned for the systemic vulnerability from tephra fallout.
Category Theme Indicator (at municipality level)
Physical Electric power plants and Constant vulnerability=1
distribution network
Systemic Accessibility Travel time to critical facilities, energy
production sites and mobility nodes
Socioeconomic Agricultural areas Combination of three factors: agricultural
area, milk and wool production
welfare of the population. It is worth noting that eco-
nomic activities (such as agricultural activities) or eco-
nomic assets (industries, energy production sites etc.)
can be indirectly affected by, for example, the interrup-
tion of transportation services.
Physical vulnerability has been quantiﬁed considering the
hydroelectric power plants and the electricity distribution
network due to their high vulnerability to tephra fallout
(Wardman et al., 2012). Geothermal and combined-power
plants are not considered because they are a priori much less
vulnerable to tephra fallout given their thick reinforced con-
crete structure with few or no openings. We assign a vul-
nerability value of 1 to all exposed hydroelectric plants and
aerial sections of the distribution network because detailed
data to rank the vulnerability of each particular plant were
not publicly available. The electricity distribution network
has signiﬁcant interdependencies with information infras-
tructures, other utilities and services, and economic activ-
ities (Pederson et al., 2006; Laprie et al., 2007; Beccuti
et al., 2012). As a result, a disruption of hydroelectric plants
and/or the distribution network may result in severe failures
of dependent sectors, as demonstrated by the blackouts in
Italy (2003) and Germany (2006), which impacted large ar-
eas of western Europe (Menoni and Margottini, 2011).
Thesystemicvulnerabilityassessmenthasbeenperformed
considering accessibility, which is a key issue during emer-
gency situations. According to Bertolini et al. (2005), ac-
cessibility can be deﬁned as “the amount and diversity of
places that can be reached within a given travel time and/or
cost”. During a crisis, bidirectional accessibility is crucial for
both evacuating the population to safe areas and dispatch-
ing rescue teams (Galderisi and Ceudech, 2010). Although
the disruption of the mobility networks due to tephra accu-
mulation is generally temporary, it can result in signiﬁcant
cascade effects reducing accessibility to and from inhabited
areas, emergency facilities, mobility nodes, power plants or
industrial sites, with relevant consequences in terms of in-
creasing losses and slower recovery. Here we consider the
accessibility to emergency facilities (hospitals and shelters)
for using the road network. The driving time is assessed us-
ing the Spatial Analyst toolbox in Esri ArcMap 10.2 (Esri,
2012). The hierarchy of the road network is accounted for
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Figure 3. Accessibility to critical facilities: (from top to bottom)
hospitals, schools and police/ﬁre stations. All maps display the time
in minutes required to reach a given facility by road.
using the ofﬁcial speed limits. Figure 3 shows the analysis of
accessibility from inhabited areas to shelters, hospitals and
ﬁre stations. Based on this accessibility analysis we obtain
the map of the most vulnerable areas.
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Figure 4. Thematic vulnerability map for agriculture. The ﬁve-class
qualitative ranking is based on a combination of three indicators:
production of milk, production of wool and percentage of agricul-
tural area, all available at a municipality level. Maps for each indi-
cator are given in the Supplement.
Finally, and given its complexity, quantity and diversity
of data, the economic vulnerability assessment has been
performed considering the agricultural sector only, assess-
ing its relevance at a municipality level (Fig. 4). In or-
der to estimate the importance of agricultural activities, we
combine three different types of data: percentage of agri-
cultural area, production of milk and production of wool.
The percentage of agricultural area for each municipality
was estimated by extracting pastures and crops from the
CORINE Land Cover map (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/
publi/landscape/about.htm), containing an inventory of soil
use information at high resolution (100m). The produc-
tion of milk (Lyear−1) and wool for each municipality dur-
ing 2012 was provided by the Icelandic Regional Develop-
ment Institute (Byggdastofnun, 2012). Wool production is
expressed in terms of “support entitlements”, i.e., the na-
tional entitlements that municipalities receive from the cen-
tral government for their wool production and according to
their percentage of the total production of the municipal-
ity (Á. Ragnarsson, personal communication, October 2012).
Values of these three agricultural indicators have been clas-
siﬁed in a ﬁve-class vulnerability ranking (very low, low,
medium, high and very high vulnerability) using the natu-
ral breaks method (Jenks, 1967), commonly used in most
GIS software and especially suitable for visualizing differ-
ences between classes (maps for each indicator are given in
the Supplement Fig. S1).
3.3 Impact assessment
Before performing an impact analysis, it is necessary to de-
termine the link between a quantitative hazard value (thresh-
old) and each vulnerability indicator. Regarding the elec-
tricity network, there are two main impacts of tephra fall-
out: collapse/failure of network elements and ﬂash-over of
components. Wilson et al. (2011) deﬁne critical values of
ash deposition for infrastructures based on well-documented
impacts of past eruptions, and propose the value of 10 cm as
a threshold for producing medium to high damages on net-
work elements (towers, poles and lines). Moreover, Wilson et
al. (2011) show that collapse of lines has happened for tephra
fallout of a similar magnitude, while impacts on transform-
ers can happen for lower fallout values. There is little evi-
dence of impacts on power plants, but it is known that tephra
fall is likely to cause disruption or shutdown (Wardman et
al., 2012). In particular, coarse ash is more likely to cause
tephra-induced abrasion on turbines, whereas a deposition of
ﬁne ash as thick as 50–100mm may not cause strong abra-
sion. Moreover, in hydroelectric plants, tephra can engulf
water channels and affect the turbines, limiting power plant
functionality. Finally, Wardman et al. (2012) show that lower
values of tephra fallout (5–10mm) can cause tephra-induced
insulation ﬂash-over of components and provide a fragility
curve for such a phenomenon. Thus, in order to include all
effects, and according to the fragility curve, we assume that
1cm tephra fallout has a 60% probability of causing disrup-
tions of components. It is worth mentioning that we used a
fragility curve for wet tephra, adopting a conservative ap-
proach, while dry tephra is not likely to produce ﬂash-over.
Regarding the road network, tephra depositions > 1mm
(∼ 1kgm−2) can cause a lack of visibility and disorient
drivers, and can cause signiﬁcant damage to vehicles’ com-
ponents and eventual engine failure (Wilson et al., 2011).
However, this value does not take into account differences in
road design, typology of vehicles, and other aspects such as a
population’spreparednessandcoping capacity, whicharebe-
coming an important element in risk analysis (Frischknecht
et al., 2010). In the case of Iceland, critical deposition thresh-
olds for road disruption could be considerably higher due
to the characteristics of the ﬂeet of vehicles and the re-
silience of the population, who are used to coping with road
trafﬁc disruptions during winter snowfalls. We assume that
a moderate disruption of the road network may happen with
∼ 10kgm−2 tephra accumulation, while 100kgm−2 would
cause the total blockage of road transportation (Biass et al.,
2012). Finally, we consider that an accumulation of 1cm
(∼ 10kgm−2) can cause damages to agriculture and impact
livestock (Wilson et al., 2009a; Biass et al., 2012), as has
occurred during past eruptions in Iceland (Thorarinsson and
Sigvaldason, 1971; Gudmundsson et al., 1992; Höskuldsson
et al., 2007).
Overlapping probabilistic hazard maps with vulnerable
features allows for the identiﬁcation of potential impacts,
which is conditioned to the occurrence of the considered
eruptions (Biass et al., 2014). We estimated the number of
power plants and the total length of the electricity network
with respect to 5, 10 and 20% probabilities of being im-
pacted (i.e., covered by a critical tephra load > 10kgm−2)
if each scenario were to occur. Impacted features are iden-
tiﬁed by performing a GIS-based overlap of a probabilistic
hazard map and an exposed target map (Fig. 2b). We assume
that vulnerable parts of the network (Sect. 3.2) covered by
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Table 3. Estimated impacts on electricity generation and distribution systems for different eruptive scenarios. For each eruptive scenario, we
calculated the length of the electricity distribution system and the number of power plants having 5, 10 and 20% probability of being affected
by a critical ash fallout of 10kgm−2. Note that the 1947-type Hekla ERS has the highest impact on power plants due to the location of the
volcano, close to ﬁve power plants.
Probability (%) for 10kgm−2 5 10 20 5 10 20
Eruptive scenario Length impacted (km) Number of power plants
Hekla EES 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hekla ERS 500 263 106 6 5 4
Askja OES 1400 655 109 5 4 1
Katla LLERS 671 267 135 6 4 0
Eyjafjallajökull LLOES 207 122 73 2 0 0
tephra load greater than 10 kgm−2 (i.e., approximately 1cm
thickness) are expected to be disrupted, and contribute to the
systemic damage. Impacts of lower tephra fallout values are
not considered here, also accounting for the fact that not all
components are necessarily directly exposed to tephra fall-
out. Expected impacts are displayed in Table 3. We partially
account for the uncertainties related to the critical threshold
choice by varying the probability of overpassing it between 5
and 20% (Tables 3 and 4). Note that Katla has a high impact
on power plants at any value of probability considered, due
to its close proximity to ﬁve power plants. Moreover, tephra
fallout from a Hekla 1947-type eruption can impact impor-
tant electricity lines that connect power plants to the rest
of the network, while the occurrence of a Hekla 2000-type
scenario has a low probability (< 5%) of impacting power
plants and electrical infrastructure. Both the Hekla 1947 and
the Katla scenario have a high probability (up to 20%) of
impacting important power lines that bring electricity to the
southeastern region. An eruption at Eyjafjallajökull similar
to that of 2010 could also impact these power lines (with a
10% probability). Finally, in the event of an 1875-type erup-
tion at Askja, power lines may also suffer strong impacts.
The occurrence of such a scenario may in fact disrupt an
important line that connects the eastern part of the country
with geothermal and hydroelectric power plants located in
the north and provides electricity to an important aluminum
smelter (Fig. 2b). Note that, although a Hekla 2000-type
eruption does not seem to affect any power plant, Biass et
al. (2014) show that low tephra accumulations (∼ 1kgm−2)
can be produced in the area surrounding the volcano, and
thus the possibility of having impacts due to a Hekla 2000-
type scenario should not be discarded.
Biass et al. (2014) show that, if the considered eruptive
scenarios deﬁned for Katla and Askja were to occur, the
probability of having tephra deposition of 10 and 1kgm−2 in
southern Iceland (ranging between 20 and 50%) is substan-
tial,whileineasternIcelanditissomewhatlower(5to20%).
Thus, agricultural activity in these areas can be impacted and
livestock can suffer from ﬂuorine intoxication due to wa-
ter and soil contamination. We estimated the area devoted
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Figure 5. Number of people as a function of driving time to reach
the closest critical infrastructures (i.e., hospital, police/ﬁre station
and schools).
to agricultural activities that has 5, 10 and 20% probability
of being impacted (i.e., covered by a critical tephra load
>10kgm−2) in the case of each eruptive scenario occur-
ring. Results are summarized in Tables 4 and 5 and can be
compared with the corresponding tephra accumulation haz-
ard maps and vulnerability maps (Fig. 4 and Supplement
Fig. S1). The highest impacts on crops are caused by the
occurrence of the considered LLERS at Katla, followed by
a 2010-type LLOES at Eyjafjallajökull, while pastures are
expected to be particularly impacted in the case of an 1875-
type OES at Askja and the considered LLERS at Katla. A
2000-type ERS eruption at Hekla is not likely to impact agri-
cultural activities.
Impacts are also estimated on the basis of the accessi-
bility analysis using least-cost-distance models (Wood and
Schmidtlein,2012).Usingthecensuscontainedintheofﬁcial
GIS database (i.e., polygons of inhabited areas; Landmælin-
gar Islands, 2012), we calculated the size of the population
located in areas classiﬁed in terms of travel time (Fig. 5) to
critical facilities: schools (Fig. 3a), hospitals (Fig. 3b) and
police/ﬁre stations (Fig. 3c). The Spatial Analyst toolbox of
the ESRI ArcMap 10.2 software was used to calculate the
shortest travel time from any pixel on the map to reach a crit-
ical facility using the road network. The hierarchy of the
ofﬁcial road network (Landmælingar Islands, 2012) and the
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Table 4. Estimated impacts on agricultural activities for different eruptive scenarios. Area of crops and pasture having 5, 10 and 20%
probability of being affected by a critical ash fallout of 10kgm−2. Katla LLERS and Eyjafjallajökull LLOES 2010-type scenarios cause the
greatest impacts on crops, while pastures are particularly affected by eruptions of types Askja OES 1875 and Katla LLERS.
Probability (%) for 10kgm−2 5 10 20 5 10 20
Eruptive scenario Crops impacted (km2) Pastures impacted (km2)
Hekla EES 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hekla ERS 10 0 0 281 13 0
Askja OES 10 1 0 586 287 26
Katla LLERS 14 7 1 361 125 101
Eyjafjallajökull LLOES 12 9 7 12 9 7
Table 5. Indicators (and estimators) deﬁned for systemic vulnerability of the European air trafﬁc system to tephra dispersal.
Vulnerability category Vulnerability theme Vulnerability indicator Vulnerability estimator
Systemic Airports (all of Europe and Passengers (nday−1)
relevance of features northwestern Europe) Good (tyear−1)
Routes (all of Europe) Number of average daily
connections
Main Routes (northwestern Europe) Passengers (nday−1)
Goods (tyear−1)
Airspace sectors (FIRS, all of Europe) Trafﬁc rate per FIR
Socioeconomic Air trafﬁc and Population Population/NUTS-2
development Air trafﬁc Goods/NUTS-2
passengers/NUTS-2
Accessibility Multi-modal accessibility/NUTS-2
speed limit for each road class were respected and imple-
mented in a cost raster for accessibility analysis.
4 European-scale vulnerability and impacts
As clearly demonstrated during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption
in 2010, the European air trafﬁc system is largely vulnera-
ble to loss of functionality of its elements when exposed to
volcanic ash. The magnitude of systemic impacts depends on
the relevance of the disrupted elements, and impacts of ash
clouds can occur very far from the source (Ceudech et al.,
2011). Here, we analyze the systemic vulnerability of Euro-
pean air trafﬁc system and the socioeconomic vulnerability
of the areas hosting its main airports.
4.1 Exposed targets
We deﬁne vulnerability indicators based on the analysis of
European air trafﬁc system, including main exposed airports
and aviation routes. The analysis is performed at the Euro-
pean scale, but we focus on those regions where our hazard
assessment indicates that impacts from ash dispersal can be
signiﬁcant.
The European air trafﬁc network has more than 2000 in-
ternational airports handling approximately 170000 overall
dailyﬂightsonaverage(WegnerandMarsh,2007).However,
over 50% of the European air trafﬁc is concentrated in the
top 35 airports (Wegner and Marsh, 2007). The European air
trafﬁc network is scale-free (Wilkinson et al., 2001), mean-
ing that these main hubs are the most relevant to the system,
and therefore highly vulnerable to its failure. The main Euro-
pean hub is London Heathrow, with 61 million terminal pas-
sengers on international ﬂights in 2010 (Heathrow Airports,
2013), followed by Paris Charles de Gaulle. The ﬁve London
airports (Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and London
City) account together for more than 60% of the total num-
ber of UK passengers according to the UK Department of
Transport. In 2011, London’s airports handled more than 120
million passengers and 1.7Mt of freight (CAA, 2012). More-
over, the most intense freight trafﬁc in Europe during 2009
was between the UK and four European states: Germany,
Netherlands, France and Belgium (PricewaterhouseCoopers,
2011). The London area is therefore one of the most critical
and strategic points within the European air trafﬁc network,
and the airspace between London, Paris, Frankfurt and Ams-
terdamconstitutesthedensestpartoftheEuropeancivilavia-
tion network. It therefore follows that the European air trafﬁc
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network is particularly vulnerable to the failure of some of
these strategic hubs.
At a national level, Keﬂavík airport is also strategic for
the Icelandic economy. In 2011, Keﬂavík handled 97.5% of
all international passengers (1.75 million; Keﬂavík Interna-
tional Airport, 2012), 49.2% of domestic passengers (0.75
million), and more than 99% of all cargo operations. Air-
based commercial relationships with Europe are very im-
portant for the Icelandic socioeconomic system. In fact, the
European Economic Area market (i.e., the 27 EU countries
plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein) accounts for 82.7
and 61.9% of total Icelandic exports and imports, respec-
tively. The main commercial partners are Netherlands, Ger-
many, the UK, and Norway. Iceland’s imports come mainly
fromNorway,USA,Germany,NetherlandsandtheUK(Stat-
ice, 2012). According to the 2011 statistics, Keﬂavík’s most
important passenger destinations were Copenhagen, London
and Oslo. During the period of 2010–2011 the Icelandic
airspace experienced a 9% growth in trafﬁc (counting over-
ﬂights) (Isavia, 2012), and, although peripheral in the Euro-
pean network, it is strategic for intercontinental ﬂights from
and to the USA and Canada. Disruption of air trafﬁc con-
nections can therefore substantially impact on both local and
regional economies.
Based on these considerations, the exposed targets for
our systemic vulnerability analysis are the main airports and
routes to north and central Europe and the most relevant so-
cioeconomic features of the areas where the main airports are
located. In order to have a vulnerability assessment mean-
ingful to civil aviation stakeholders, we consider European
airspace sectors, following the current classiﬁcation (EURO-
CONTROL, 2005). Flight Information Regions (FIRs) are
subdivided according to their speciﬁc role into CTA (control
area), OCA (oceanic control area), ACC (area control cen-
ter) and UAC (upper area control), which are airspace sec-
tors not hosting airports (EUROCONTROL, 2005). Aerial
sectors represent a key component of the air trafﬁc network
because each sector has an associated capacity, which is the
main parameter for air trafﬁc management (Leal de Matos
and Ormerod, 2000; Leal de Matos and Powell, 2002; Dell’
Olmo and Lulli, 2003).
Finally, we note that the territorial context of an airport
is also relevant for the estimation of socioeconomic vulner-
ability and impact because the vulnerability of a region is
proportional to its dependence on air trafﬁc.
4.2 Vulnerability indicators
Table 5 summarizes the systemic and socioeconomic vulner-
ability indicators deﬁned for the European air trafﬁc system.
Figures 6–10 show vulnerability maps produced for the con-
sidered features (airports, routes, airspace sectors and Euro-
pean regions). Visualization is performed through the open
sourceGISQgis(http://www.qgis.org/en/site/),usingtheEu-
ropean GIS database (GISCO, 2013) and European air trafﬁc
database (courtesy of EUROCONTROL). Unless speciﬁed
otherwise, all indicators are reclassiﬁed into a qualitative
ﬁve-class ranking, ranging from very low to very high, us-
ing the natural breaks method (Jenks, 1967). Vulnerability
indicators include the following:
1. Strategic airports. We assume that the higher the trafﬁc
of an airport, the higher its relevance and, consequently,
the higher the vulnerability of the system to its poten-
tial disruption. We classiﬁed all European airports ac-
cording to trafﬁc of passengers and freight during 2012
(Eurostat, 2013), and this identiﬁed Frankfurt, London
Heathrow, Amsterdam and Paris Charles de Gaulle as
the strategic elements for the European air trafﬁc sys-
tem in terms of passengers and goods. Given that the
probability of ash dispersal affecting southeastern Eu-
rope is low (Biass et al., 2014) and that we aim to assess
the vulnerability within a more constrained domain, we
performed the same analysis for central and northwest-
ern Europe. Having selected the most relevant airports
in central and northern Europe in terms of air trafﬁc val-
ues (Supplement Table S3), we ranked them according
to passengers and freight values (Fig. 6). The most rel-
evant airports are London Heathrow, Paris Charles de
Gaulle, Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Munich, which have
already been identiﬁed as main hubs at the European
level. Copenhagen airport also has a high relevance for
trafﬁc to northern Europe (including Iceland).
2. Strategic routes, classiﬁed in two ways. The ﬁrst
classiﬁcation builds upon the average number of
connections between each pair of European airports
in 2012 (courtesy of EUROCONTROL). We assume
that the higher the number of connections the higher
the importance of the route and the higher the sys-
temic vulnerability of the system to its failure. This
classiﬁcation reveals that the top ﬁve connections are
Madrid–Barcelona (Spain), Istanbul–Izmir (Turkey),
Paris–Toulouse (France), Oslo–Bergen (Norway) and
Barcelona–Palma de Mallorca (Spain). Constraining
the analysis to central and northwestern Europe,
the most relevant connections are London–Paris,
Paris–Frankfurt, London–Edinburgh, London–Dublin,
Munich–Frankfurt, Copenhagen–Aalborg, Oslo–
Trondheim, Oslo–Bergen and Oslo–Stavanger. This
analysis underlines that the main city pairs are often
composed of national connections between ﬁrst- and
second-largest cities, as described by Wegner and
Marsh (2007). The second classiﬁcation is based
on air trafﬁc (passengers and freight) for each city
pair, i.e., for the main routes between a considered
airport and its partners (Eurostat, 2013). This kind
of classiﬁcation considers the relevance of European
routes for a selected sub-system constituted by the
considered airport and its main European partners.
For example, we show two relevant cases: the London
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Figure 6. Main airport hubs in central and northwestern Europe depending on the trafﬁc of passengers (a) and goods (b) during 2010
(Eurostat, 2012). The values represent the relevance of these airports for passengers and freight air trafﬁc. The most relevant airports are
London Heathrow, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Munich.
Figure 7. Main European routes from/to London Heathrow (top) and the rest of the airports in Greater London (Gatwick, Luton and Stansted,
displayed together, bottom). Routes are ranked according to their importance in terms of passengers (left) and freight (right) trafﬁc. The
vulnerability classiﬁcation is based on the whole range of air trafﬁc data between main London airports and the considered European airports
in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012). The same classiﬁcation criterion is used for all ﬁgures and the comparison underlines that Heathrow airport handles
the most strategic routes (corresponding to more than 1.2 million passengers per year).
Figure 8. Main European routes of passengers (a) and freight (b) from/to Keﬂavík airport. Analysis is performed for the routes connecting
the main airports shown in Fig. 6. The vulnerability classiﬁcation is based on 2010 data (Eurostat, 2012).
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hub, strategic for European air trafﬁc, and Keﬂavík
airport, the most important in Iceland. The relative
importance of routes is a measure of the vulnerability
of the sub-system to the disruption of that particu-
lar route. In our analysis, the London hub includes
the city’s four main airports: Heathrow, Gatwick,
Stansted and Luton. Figure 7 shows strategic routes
of London airports for passengers (left) and freight
(right), for Heathrow airport (top) and for the other
three airports, displayed together (bottom). The top
London destinations (> 1.2millionpassengersyear−1)
are Dublin, Edinburgh, Paris and Frankfurt. London
Heathrow–Dublin is the most important connection,
with more than 1.5 million passengers per year. In
terms of cargo, Stansted is also an important hub with
main destinations to Frankfurt, Brussels, Stockholm
and Paris. Figure 8 shows the most important partners
for Keﬂavík airport in terms of passengers (a) and
goods (b). Copenhagen, London and Oslo are strategic
destinations for passengers, whereas Amsterdam,
London, Paris, and Cologne–Bonn are main nodes for
freight transportation. It is worth noting that the main
passenger routes from Keﬂavík airport have the same
order of magnitude as the less relevant route for the
London hub (∼ 300000 passengers per year). Keﬂavík
routes, if classiﬁed using the same range used for the
London airports, would fall into the low-vulnerability
class, and their relevance would be diminished in the
subsequent impact analysis. Using a scale-dependent
classiﬁcation criterion allows for identiﬁcation of routes
that can be secondary at a broader European scale but
are strategic for the national scale.
3. Number of daily European ﬂights in each airspace sec-
tor, which gives a measure of the airspace congestion.
For simplicity, our analysis uses data of one of the peak
days during 2012 (29 June) and assumes that this par-
ticular day is representative of high-trafﬁc situations in
Europe. For each airspace sector, we counted how many
times per day the sector is crossed by ﬂights at any FL
and assign a vulnerability value accordingly. Figure 9
shows that the most congested airspace sectors are lo-
cated in France (Brest, Paris and Marseille FIRs), the
southern UK (London FIR), Germany (Langen, Bremen
and Hannover FIRs), Netherlands (Amsterdam FIR),
and Italy and Spain (Milan, Rome and Madrid FIRs).
Some FIRs show lower trafﬁc rate compared to the sur-
roundingareas,forexampleIreland(ShannonFIRs)and
other regions of France (Bordeaux and Reims FIRs).
4. Relevance of air trafﬁc for European regions, based
on a combination of four regional indicators: popu-
lation (Eurostat, 2013, data from 2012); total num-
ber of passengers and tonnes of freight transported
by air (Eurostat, 2013, data from 2011); and multi-
modal accessibility, which takes into account the
Figure 9. Vulnerability classiﬁcation of the European airspace sec-
tors based on the air trafﬁc rate in the sector during a peak day of
2012 (source: EUROCONTROL, 2012). FIRs with very high vul-
nerability values (blue) are London, Paris and Munich.
presence/absence of alternative transport modes and
their cost (ESPON, 2004; TRACC, 2010, p. 17). We
use multi-modal accessibility produced by the ESPON
project (ESPON©, 2013) as an indicator of vulnerabil-
ity: areas with low multi-modal accessibility are there-
fore more vulnerable to the failure of one transportation
modeduetothelimitedvarietyofalternativetransporta-
tion modes available. According to Fürst et al. (2000),
multi-modal indicators have much more explanatory
power with respect to regional economic performance
than any accessibility indicator based only on a single
mode. We propose a ﬁrst-level assessment of socioe-
conomic vulnerability by combining these four indica-
tors under the assumption that vulnerability increases
when the dependency on air trafﬁc is higher and the
multi-modal accessibility lower. All indicators refer to
the 2003 NUTS-2 regions (Nomenclature of Territo-
rial Units for Statistics), a hierarchical system for di-
viding the economic territory of the EU for the appli-
cation of regional policies. We combine the four indi-
cators by summing the values for each NUTS-2 region,
and reclassifying the resulting map into ﬁve vulnerabil-
ity classes. Population, air trafﬁc and multi-modal ac-
cessibility are classiﬁed into ﬁve equal interval classes,
while the multi-modal accessibility database produced
by the ESPON project is already ranked into ﬁve qual-
itative classes, ranging from 1 (highly below average)
to 5 (highly above average). Air trafﬁc data show that
the areas which most rely on air trafﬁc correspond to
the regions hosting the main European cities of Lon-
don, Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam. But socioeco-
nomic vulnerability is not only related to the volume
of air trafﬁc: for example, Ireland has a low multi-
modal accessibility (Supplement Fig. S2) but a consid-
erable population (Supplement Fig. S2). The resulting
vulnerability map (Fig. 10) facilitates recognition of the
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Figure 10. Vulnerability of the NUTS-2 regions, calculated as
a combination of population, air trafﬁc values and multi-modal ac-
cessibility value (see the Supplement Fig. S2 for individual maps).
High-vulnerability areas are those having high population and low
accessibility rates, for example Ireland and Norway.
areas most dependent on air trafﬁc, where a relatively
high population and/or air trafﬁc values are associated
with low multi-modal accessibility. The most vulner-
able NUTS-2 areas are therefore the ones hosting the
citiesofLondon,Paris,FrankfurtandAmsterdam.Also,
Ireland, Norway and northern France show a medium–
high vulnerability. Due to the intrinsic nature of being
an island, air trafﬁc cannot easily be substituted by al-
ternative transportation means. For this reason, Ireland
has medium vulnerability to air trafﬁc disruptions.
Given the differences in the indicators of vulnerability, we
evaluate the expected impacts for each single vulnerability
feature, i.e., for the national-scale assessment, we do not
merge the different thematic vulnerability maps (Figs. 6–
10) into a single map. However, once the strategic elements
and their relevance are identiﬁed, it is possible to assess the
expected impacts of each eruptive scenario through a GIS-
based overlap of hazard and vulnerability maps.
4.3 Impact assessment
We propose three different methods for assessing the impacts
of tephra dispersal on European air trafﬁc. Each method fo-
cuses on producing speciﬁc results, and could be used to sup-
port risk management strategies at different levels. It should
be kept in mind that impact assessment results are condi-
tioned to the occurrence of the eruptive scenario (Biass et
al., 2014).
The ﬁrst method consists of a qualitative GIS-based vi-
sual overlap of hazard and vulnerability maps. The graphical
overlap allows for an immediate identiﬁcation of the routes
that have the highest probability of being disrupted for each
scenario. For example, the overlap of the Askja hazard map
for all FLs and the main passenger routes between London
Heathrow and Europe (Fig. 7a) reveals which routes would
have the highest probability of being disrupted in this sce-
nario. The overlap of hazard and vulnerability can also be
performed using hazard maps for speciﬁc FLs and averaged
arrival time and persistence maps, which allow for the poten-
tial duration of a disruption to be inferred.
The second method estimates the impact (movements dis-
rupted, passengers and freight stranded) at given airports
by multiplying the average atmospheric persistence time of
a given hazardous ash concentration for a given eruptive sce-
nario by the hourly averaged trafﬁc. Here, we assume that, if
the critical ash concentration is reached at any FL over an air-
port,allﬂightoperationsaredisrupted.Forexample,Tables6
and 7 show the expected impacts at London Heathrow and
Keﬂavík airports for the different eruptive scenarios consid-
ered,respectively.Air trafﬁcvaluesfor LondonHeathroware
estimated dividing yearly averages (CAA, 2012; Heathrow
airport, 2013) by 365. Keﬂavík air trafﬁc values are inferred
from the Keﬂavík airport 2011 facts and ﬁgures document
(Keﬂavík International Airport, 2011). According to Biass
et al. (2014), the conditional probability of having more than
24h of disruption at London airports from Askja 1875 and
Katla 1918 scenarios is about 5 and 1%, respectively. The
conditional probability of having more than 24h of disrup-
tion due to Hekla activity is lower than 1%. Thus, there is
a substantial probability of having strong disruptions in the
London area due to high-magnitude explosive volcanic erup-
tions at Askja and Katla, and a low probability of having im-
pacts at London due to lower magnitude events at Hekla.
Finally, the third method consists of overlapping hazard
and vulnerability data and combining the values on a cell-by-
cell basis, i.e., multiplying hazard and vulnerability values
within each cell. To do that, hazard and vulnerability maps
are converted to raster format (GeoTIFF) using GRASS GIS
(Neteler et al., 2012). We use probabilistic hazard maps for
each scenario that account for the probability of disruption
at any FL (Biass et al., 2014) and vulnerability maps of the
airspace sectors (Fig. 9). Such maps are then overlapped on
a cell-by-cell basis and the resulting impact map is recon-
verted to vector format, aggregating the maximum impact
value over FIRs areas. The ﬁnal results are impact maps con-
tainingimpactvaluesforeachFIR,reclassiﬁedintoﬁvequal-
itatively impact classes (very low to very high impact) using
thenaturalbreaksmethod.TheseresultsareshowninFig.11.
It has to be stressed that the resulting impact represents rela-
tive comparison between FIRs rather than a quantitative im-
pact. The Hekla ERS 2000-type scenario (Fig. 11a) produces
very high impacts in the Reykjavík FIR, high impacts in the
London FIR and low impacts in the Shanwick OCA and the
Norway FIRs, but is not expected to affect central Europe.
The Hekla ERS 1947-type scenario (Fig. 11b) produces very
high impacts in the Reykjavík FIR, and Paris, Brest and Mar-
seille FIR; high impacts in the London FIR; and low impacts
in the Shanwick, Norway and Sweden FIRs. Such a scenario
is also likely to result in low impacts in the northern Ger-
many and Poland FIRs. Both the Katla LLERS (c) and the
AskjaOES1875-type(d)scenariosarelikelytoproducehigh
impacts in the Keﬂavík FIR as well as the southern UK and
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Table 6. First-order estimation of expected impacts at London Heathrow airport for different eruption scenarios based on the averaged
persistence. Air trafﬁc values are based on yearly averages (CAA, 2012).
Eruptive scenario Mean persistence Movements Passengers Freight
all FLs (h) disrupted (n) stranded (n) stranded (t)
Hekla-2000 ERS ∼ 3 ∼ 160 ∼ 23000 ∼ 600
Hekla-1947 ERS ∼ 4 ∼ 180 ∼ 27000 ∼ 700
Katla LLERS ∼ 10 ∼ 530 ∼ 78000 ∼ 2000
Askja OES ∼ 8 ∼ 410 ∼ 60000 ∼ 1500
Table 7. First-order estimation of expected impacts at Keﬂavík airport for different eruption scenarios based on the averaged persistence. Air
trafﬁc values are based on the Keﬂavík airport 2011 facts and ﬁgures document (Isavia, 2012).
Eruptive scenario Mean persistence Movements Passengers Freight
all FLs (h) disrupted (n) stranded (n) stranded (t)
Hekla-2000 ERS ∼ 5 ∼ 20 ∼ 950 ∼ 20
Hekla-1947 ERS ∼ 8 ∼ 30 ∼ 1500 ∼ 40
Katla LLERS ∼ 21 ∼ 90 ∼ 4300 ∼ 110
Askja OES ∼ 18 ∼ 70 ∼ 3600 ∼ 90
France FIRs, mostly due to their high trafﬁc rates (and there-
fore high vulnerability). These scenarios can also produce
high impacts in the Norway, Sweden, Austria and Germany
FIRs. Low impacts are expected in the rest of Europe.
5 Discussion
Outcomes of our impact assessment are derived from proba-
bilistic analysis, which are conditioned to the occurrence of
speciﬁc eruptions at speciﬁc volcanoes described in the haz-
ard scenarios of Biass et al. (2014). Volcanoes were selected
based on the probability of eruption and signiﬁcance of asso-
ciated impact, while the hazard scenarios were derived from
ﬁeld observations to be statistically representative. However,
an eruption at a different volcano or a different type of activ-
ity at the selected volcanoes cannot be excluded, and there-
fore the impact in zone other than those identiﬁed in our as-
sessment cannot be discarded. The main value of our work is
the new multi-source, multi-scale strategy introduced to as-
sess both hazard and impact at different scales that can be
easily applied to other volcanoes and other hazard scenarios.
Nonetheless, considering the wide range of hazard scenarios
investigated and the statistically representative meteorologi-
cal conditions analyzed at the European scale, our hazard and
impact assessments can be considered as a ﬁrst-level evalua-
tion for the whole Icelandic region.
5.1 National-level vulnerability and impact assessment
The methodology presented here to assess vulnerability to
tephra fallout at a national scale was developed for the par-
ticular case of Iceland in cooperation with local stakeholders
and the Icelandic Civil Protection Department, and uses only
publicly available data. However, the method could poten-
tially be applied in different geographic and socioeconomic
contexts where similar public censuses are available. The list
of exposed features identiﬁed in Sect. 3.1 is valid elsewhere
and Table 8 lists the type of data that, ideally, should be in-
cluded in any comprehensive vulnerability assessment. For
example,fromasocioeconomicpointofview,theroleofpro-
ductive activities and the number of employees for activity
or sector should be taken into account. Industrial and tertiary
activities, for example, often constitute the backbone of the
socioeconomic system, driving local development and distri-
bution of resources. In terms of transportation, one inconve-
nience is that national statistics are rarely given by transport
mode, making it difﬁcult to identify the precise contribution
of air trafﬁc to the socioeconomic system. Also, water supply
has been recognized as an exposure target in a few isolated
cases (Sect. 3.1) but is not taken into account for the esti-
mation of impacts, because it needs to be treated at a more
local scale. A census of water supply systems (for example,
water quality control and monitoring) may support response
strategies, in particular for areas with strong agricultural sec-
tors (Fig. 4) that can suffer substantial impacts from tephra
fallout (Sect. 3.3). Finally, only a few data sets were avail-
able at a municipality level or in the form of disaggregated
data (that is, data available at the same administrative level
used for collection). For example, most economic and labor
market indicators were produced at the national level. This
lack of disaggregated data is a common problem in most risk
assessments, and the availability of disaggregated data sets,
or data sources deﬁned at lower administrative levels, would
improve the vulnerability assessment presented here.
Figures 3 and 4 allow for the spatial distribution of the
most vulnerable areas and targets to be identiﬁed according
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Figure 11. Expected impacts of tephra dispersal on European airspace sectors (FIRs) if the different scenarios considered were to occur: (a)
Hekla 2000 type, (b) Hekla 1947 type, (c) Askja 1875 type and (d) Katla scenarios.
Table 8. Availability, sources and type of data used for the vulnerability assessment to tephra fallout at the national scale.
Data Available Source Coverage Type
Population Yes Statice Municipalities Number
Population trends Yes Byggðastofnun Municipalities Percentage
Population age Yes Statice Municipalities Number
Power plants Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
http://www.or.is/en/about
Aluminum smelters Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
Hospitals Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
Shelters Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
Police stations Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
Fire stations Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Location
Road network Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Digital map
Electricity network Yes Landmælingar Islands Disaggregated Digital map
Ports (import/export) Yes Statice Disaggregated Import/export values
Airports (air trafﬁc) Yes Isavia Disaggregated Passengers/freight values
Land use Yes Corine Land Cover Homogeneous areas Corine classiﬁcation
Milk production Yes Byggðastofnun Municipalities Liters/support entitlements
Wool production Yes Byggðastofnun Municipalities Support entitlements
Civil protection units No – – –
Productive activities No – – –
Employees for productive
activities/sectors
Average income No – – –
Water supply No – – –
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to the considered vulnerability themes. It is important to
stress that the vulnerability scores, expressed either as nu-
merical scores or qualitative judgments, normally represent
comparative (i.e., relative) values. This makes the merging
of different vulnerability maps into a single ﬁnal map a com-
plex process. On the one hand, the perspective of single indi-
cators can be lost when combined with others. On the other
hand, single merged maps are more synthetic and workable
if they involve no loss of information. In this work, and given
the very different nature of the indicators considered, we pre-
fer not to overlap maps of different vulnerability categories.
Nonetheless, the comparison of information related to each
vulnerability indicator can provide a signiﬁcant support both
to land use and emergency planning.
Results from national vulnerability and impact assess-
ments allow for deﬁnition of priority areas for risk mitiga-
tion strategies. Comparison of population values with other
vulnerability indicators can support the prioritization of in-
terventions for long-term vulnerability mitigation plans. For
example, northeasternIceland has a substantialprobability of
being affected by deposition of tephra in the case of an OES
occurrence at Askja, and this hazardous phenomenon should
be considered in long-term territorial plans. Recent popula-
tion statistics (Byggðastofnun, 2012) show a positive trend
in this area due to the construction of a dam and the conse-
quent generation of employment. The increase in population
and the arrival of non-local workers, less familiar with an
active volcanic environment, should be taken into account,
e.g., through educational programs. The results of the impact
assessment can also support Icelandic policies in the main
strategic sectors such as transportation, economic activities
or location of critical facilities. Table 3 shows that the largest
impacts are expected from the occurrence of selected erup-
tive scenarios (Table 1) at Askja, Katla and Hekla, due to the
presence of power plants and a main power line in their sur-
roundings. Results suggest that moderate tephra fallout from
a 1947-type ERS at Hekla can have major impacts on the sur-
rounding power plants. Occurrence of low-magnitude 2000-
type ERS activity at Hekla does not seem to produce such
major impacts but, given its very high frequency (10-year re-
pose time; Höskuldsson et al., 2007), should also be taken
into account. In fact, repeated tephra fallout could have long-
term impacts on power plant equipment and external com-
ponents. Expected impacts on agricultural activities are in
general limited to the few crops located in the southeast of
the island. Table 4 shows that the major impacts on crops
are expected in the case of an LLERS at Katla and a 2010-
type LLOES at Eyjafjallajökull. Moreover, ash fallout from
the occurrence of eruptive scenarios at Askja and Katla is
expected to cover several square kilometer of pasture in the
south and east of Iceland (Table 4). Due to the importance
of agricultural activities (wool in particular) for the Icelandic
economy, these results should be taken into account in order
to improve preparedness and reduce impacts on the national
socioeconomic system. Finally, results of the accessibility
analysis (Figs. 3, 5) help the identiﬁcation of zones with lim-
ited access to critical infrastructure by classifying the pop-
ulation in terms of travel time to strategic features (hospi-
tals, police/ﬁre stations and potential shelters). This analy-
sis accounts for the travel speed of the road network, where
pixels outside the road network are only allowed an average
walking speed. Note that unlike agent-based strategies, the
resulting model is time-independent and does not attempt to
account for dynamic travel time costs due to route capacity
or road congestion (Wood and Schmidtlein, 2012). However,
least-cost-distance models still provide key information for
preparedness and planning by identifying heterogeneities in
the accessibility over the entire territory rather than model-
ing the behavior of individuals. A combined look at Figs. 1
and 3 highlights how most of the critical infrastructures are
clustered around the main towns, with the main zone of low
accessibility being the Vatnajökull area. Figure 5 is a combi-
nation of the analysis performed in Fig. 3 and the population
census, and helps visualize the number of people as a func-
tion of the travel time to critical infrastructures. Figure 3c
also shows that although uninhabited, Vestfjörður, the north-
westernmost peninsula, has a low accessibility to police/ﬁre
stations. This is clearly reﬂected in Fig. 5, where a travel time
greater than 3h is associated with thousands of people. As a
result, such a method is valuable to plan the implementation
of additional critical infrastructures for future crises.
The analysis of impacts performed here is essentially qual-
itative. The underlying vulnerability assessment does not in-
clude a physical vulnerability analysis of the elements at
stake, due to the limited availability of data at the scale of
the analysis. The deﬁnition of critical ash load thresholds
does not rely on fragility curves, instrument commonly rec-
ognized amongst the risk management community but hav-
ing a very limited application to volcanology (ENSURE, WP
1 – Del. 1.1.1). In particular, fragility curves to tephra fall-
out are available for building typologies (associated with a
given physical vulnerability), but are still not well charac-
terized in the case of ash fallout on main infrastructures, for
which there are many factors (composition, humidity) that
play an important role (Wilson et al., 2011). In addition, ash
load thresholds can vary with weather conditions. For exam-
ple, wet tephra has a higher impact on electric components
(Wardman et al., 2012) and enhances the effects of ash cover-
age on road trafﬁc (Wilson et al., 2011). Wilson et al. (2009b)
pointed out the seasonal character of vulnerability, an im-
portant factor for certain activities such as agriculture and
farming that have a seasonal character (Johánnesson, 2010).
For example, the same hazardous phenomenon could have
higher impacts on crops during the sowing, growth and ﬂow-
ering phases, while less impacts are expected on unplowed
ﬁelds. Adapting thresholds to seasonal and weather varia-
tion would support the deﬁnition of speciﬁc seasonal strate-
gies. Finally, we adopted the same threshold for all eruptive
scenarios, ignoring that impacts can depend on many factors
suchasashgrainsizeandcomposition(Wilsonetal.,2009b).
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Even though we adopted different grain-size distributions for
each eruptive scenario (Biass et al., 2014), no study exists on
ash load threshold dependency on granulometry and compo-
sition. Identifying critical ash load thresholds with single val-
ues introduces limitations into the usage of results. But given
thatthemainaimofthisworkisidentifyingtheareasandfea-
tures that are expected to be impacted, results can support de-
tailed impact assessment analysis at speciﬁc areas, necessary
in order to produce more reliable results. Nowadays there is
a growing need for speciﬁc studies to be performed in order
to deﬁne quantitative thresholds that produce physical dam-
ages of elements and, eventually, systemic impacts. In future,
fragility curves would allow hazard intensity and probability
of damage to be accounted for, and our impact assessment
methodology would be developed accordingly.
5.2 Vulnerability and impact assessment of European
air trafﬁc
We have proposed a vulnerability assessment that identiﬁes
the elements (airports, routes and airspace sectors) likely to
have major impacts on the European air trafﬁc system in
the case of tephra dispersal from eruption of an Icelandic
volcano. London is recognized to be the core of the Eu-
ropean aviation system, followed by Paris, Amsterdam and
Frankfurt, according to the number of connections handled
(Fig. 6). Our analysis has also identiﬁed the routes that have
the highest socioeconomic relevance, constrained to central
and northwestern Europe based on the outcome of the haz-
ard assessment (Biass et al., 2014). The analysis emphasizes
the role of minor connections that, despite being secondary
at the European level, are strategic for national economies.
For example, the analysis of air trafﬁc at London and Ke-
ﬂavík airports showed that London–Dublin and Reykjavík–
Copenhagen are very important routes (Figs. 7 and 8) and
their disruption could affect national economies and those of
their commercial partners. We also estimated vulnerability
of FIRs (Fig. 9) based on trafﬁc data from a peak day. This
ﬁrst-order estimation could be enhanced using air trafﬁc data
during a larger time interval to account for weekly/seasonal
trafﬁc variability. Moreover, other indicators for FIRs, for ex-
ample accounting for the different types of ﬂights (charter,
commercial, business, cargo), could also be considered. De-
spite these methodological limitations, the identiﬁcation of
strategic airspace sectors is an important result itself given
that current air trafﬁc management procedures are based on
airspace capacity (Cook, 2007).
The methodology proposed in this work is ﬂexible enough
to include new administrative boundaries and new proce-
dures in the vulnerability assessment. This is important if,
as expected, regulation changes occur. At a European level,
new trends in air trafﬁc management are driven by the Sin-
gle European Sky Commission Project (SESAR, http://ec.
europa.eu/transport/modes/air/sesar/), aimed at ensuring ca-
pacity and safety needs to European aviation. The SESAR
program includes the constitution of functional airspace
blocks(FABs),expectedtobeoperativeinthenextfewyears,
which would reduce airspace fragmentation and support in-
tegrated airspace management (Arroyo, 2008). In the case
of ash-contaminated airspace, the new SESAR regulation
framework could be included in the analysis to support the
development of new centralized strategies. It has also been
suggested that the short-term capacity of sectors may be ne-
gotiated in order to allow rerouting of ﬂights to opened FIRs,
thus improving the performance of the network. However,
procedures to be adopted in the case of ash-contaminated
airspace (e.g., the possibility of overﬂying ash clouds) are
still under discussion. The idea that the airlines will be able
to decide whether to ﬂy or not in ash-contaminated airspace
has been proposed by EUROCONTROL and implemented
during the 2011 VOLCEX exercise, as described in the ﬁ-
nal report (ICAO, 2011). This new paradigm could be im-
plemented in the EUR/NAT region by several stakeholders
that, after the approval of a safety risk assessment (SRA;
Boli´ c and Sivˇ cev, 2011; EASA, 2012), would be able to de-
cide whether to ﬂy or not through ash-contaminated airspace
sectors. The introduction of SRA underlines the importance
of having a long-term perspective in risk-management pro-
cedures and plans. Long-term risk management plans could
also avoid secondary impacts, e.g., the lack of ﬂeet at non-
contaminated areas during the closure of main airports. For
example, Icelandair managed to move aircraft from Keﬂavík
to a secondary hub in the UK (Ulfarsson and Unger, 2011)
to maintain operations in non-contaminated areas (and, in
particular, intercontinental routes). Long-term hazard assess-
mentandvulnerabilityandimpactanalysiscanthereforesup-
portSRAsandmitigationmeasuresandenhancetheresponse
in the case of volcanic ash contaminated airspace. It is worth
noting that there is still no agreement on critical ash concen-
tration thresholds or any other method (retrievals, measure-
ments, ingestion rate) that may be used to characterize criti-
cal conditions for aircraft. This poses a high limitation to the
application of impact assessment methodologies such as the
one presented here. Further work should support the deﬁni-
tion of thresholds and fragility functions in order to increase
reliability of results.
In this work, we have proposed several ways of estimating
impacts on the air trafﬁc system, and our results give a wide
perspectiveofthespatialandtemporalmagnitudeofimpacts.
According to Fig. 11, all eruptive scenarios produce impacts
in the London area, but the Askja OES 1875-type and Katla
LLERS scenarios can result in major impacts for the whole
European air trafﬁc system. Low-magnitude, short-duration
activity such as a 2000-type Hekla ERS does not result in
high impacts on central European air trafﬁc, but can disrupt
relevant connections for the national economies involved
(i.e., Reykjavík–Copenhagen, London–Dublin). The proba-
bility of having hazardous mass concentrations for more than
12h (Biass et al., 2014) shows that high-magnitude scenar-
ios such as the 1875-type Askja OES event can cause major
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disruptions (> 1% probability) to London air trafﬁc. Also,
lower-magnitude but long-lasting activity such as a Katla
LLERS scenario has a > 1 and > 5% probability of pro-
ducing 12h lasting disruption to London and Scotland, re-
spectively, where the important airports of Glasgow and Ed-
inburgh could be affected. Tables 6 and 7 show expected
disruptions to Keﬂavík and London airports, based on av-
eraged data. Note that this ﬁrst-level impact assessment does
not take into account the hour of the day and/or the day of
the year in which a disruption occurs, which neglects dif-
ferences between peak and off-peak (night and early morn-
ing) times. Average persistence times give information on
the expected duration of disruptions, but given that the stan-
dard deviation for persistence time is on the order of 5–10h
(Biass et al., 2014), a high uncertainty is associated with
thesevalues.Nevertheless,thisanalysisallowsforestimation
on the order of magnitude of expected impacts and may sup-
port the deﬁnition of an “acceptable risk” based on averaged
long-term values, which could eventually support a practi-
cal framework for risk management. Finally, average arrival
time maps identify which airports and areas may need re-
sponse plans and gives an idea of how much time is available
for operations such as moving aircraft into hangars or part
of the ﬂeet to other airports. In fact, Guffanti et al. (2010)
have shown how most damaging incidents during the last 60
years occurred within the ﬁrst 1000km from source volca-
noes and within the ﬁrst 24h after eruption onset. The results
of this impact assessment may therefore support the deﬁni-
tion of strategies for many stakeholders involved in air trafﬁc
management during volcanic eruptions.
We also estimated impacts on FIRs (Fig. 11), accounting
for the presence of ash at all FLs. The same impact analy-
sis has been performed at speciﬁc FLs (Supplement Fig. S3),
leading to signiﬁcantly different results. In fact, impacts at
a given FL strongly depend on the range of column heights
of each eruption scenario, which in turn inﬂuences the prob-
ability of having ash at different FLs. For example, the Hekla
ERS 2000-type scenario does not cause impacts at FL300
but only at lower levels. Consequently, a long-term impact
assessment based on FL300 underestimates the expected im-
pacts of low-magnitude eruptions such as the 2000- and
1947-typeHeklaERSscenarios.Analogously,impactassess-
ment at airports (Tables 6 and 7) could be done consider-
ing all FLs or restricted at FL050, where most takeoff and
landing operations take place. Given that air trafﬁc manage-
ment is based on the capacity of airspace sectors and these
include several FLs (Cook, 2007), the second option seems
more useful for decision making. For these reasons, we en-
courage the use of expected impact maps at FIRs, which are
comprehensive of all FLs and provide a synthetic, conserva-
tive and meaningful support for the development of an SRA
and other risk management plans.
Finally, this work has estimated the socioeconomic vul-
nerability of Europe to air trafﬁc disruptions. The 2010 erup-
tion of Eyjafjallajökull demonstrated that impacts at strategic
airports such as London produce major systemic impacts on
the rest of the European air trafﬁc network and indirect so-
cioeconomic impacts at a global scale (Oxford Economics,
2010). One example is the interruption of Kenyan exports to
the UK (BBC News, 2010), which caused an economic im-
pact on Kenyan agricultural sectors (Alexander, 2013). Here
we did not describe such interactions but instead proposed
a methodology to compare different sources of information
that quantify the dependency of European areas on air traf-
ﬁc. The combination of demographic, trade and accessibility
information (Supplement Fig. S3) identiﬁes NUTS-2 regions
with higher dependency on air trafﬁc (Fig. 10), i.e., those
more vulnerable to air trafﬁc network disruptions. Moreover,
the comparison of vulnerability maps for NUTS-2 regions
and impact assessment results (Fig. 11 and Tables 6 and 7)
identiﬁes the most impacted areas from explosive eruptions
in Iceland. For example, Ireland has a high vulnerability be-
cause it is an island (which inherently has a low multi-modal
accessibility) and has strong social and commercial relation-
ships with the UK, resulting in high socioeconomic impacts
in the event of air trafﬁc disruption. Also, Nordic countries
such as Denmark and Norway are likely to be affected, in
particular those regions with lower multi-modal accessibil-
ity. Flexibility of the transportation system and multi-modal
accessibility are in fact critical factors that strongly inﬂuence
the societal response to air trafﬁc disruptions (Alexander,
2013). Moreover, a strategy that allows taking advantage of
all different transportation means can strongly reduce losses
during emergencies, as shown by Jones and Bolivar (2011)
for the case study of Malta during the 2010 aviation dis-
ruption. Finally, civil aviation disruption is not only a prob-
lem for private stakeholders – it affects all of society, requir-
ing procedures to mitigate the socioeconomic risk (Vainikka,
2010). Results of the vulnerability and impact assessment
performed at the European level can support a socioeco-
nomic impact analysis and the development of risk manage-
ment plans. Data from European projects such as Eurostat,
ESPON and TRACC are extremely relevant to support this
analysis.
5.3 Caveats
First, the main aim of this work is identifying the areas that
are expected to suffer impacts in the event of the selected
scenarios occurring, at both the national and European scale.
Given the difﬁculty in gathering speciﬁc data, our analysis
does not account for physical vulnerability of most features.
Thus, our simpliﬁed approach does not include an analysis of
spatial inter- and intra-dependencies and cascading effects,
as it relies on the characterization of physical vulnerability,
which is beyond the scope of this work. The systemic aspects
is covered only partially, by identifying speciﬁc elements and
infrastructures that are important to the system performance
on an a priori basis and assessing their expected impacts.
This limitation is particularly important with regards to road
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and electricity network disruptions, whose failure may cause
the disruption of dependent services and infrastructures and
eventually lower the capacity of response of areas. Studies on
electricity infrastructure vulnerability suggest that this anal-
ysis should start identifying where, how often, and for how
long the electricity supply will be interrupted. This analy-
sis should be performed by splitting the network at speciﬁc
delivery points, implying a detailed knowledge of its struc-
ture (Kjølle et al., 2011). In order to be realistic and pro-
duce usable results, this kind of analysis requires therefore a
collaboration between involved stakeholders (infrastructure
holders, service providers and end users). The same con-
clusion can be drawn at the European scale, where interde-
pendencies between elements are closely related to speciﬁc
management plans of stakeholders involved (airlines, service
providers). Thus, our work poses the basis for a speciﬁc anal-
ysis of these interdependencies by performing the ﬁrst vul-
nerability and impact assessment for tephra fallout and dis-
persal in Iceland and Europe, and pointing out this issue to
the stakeholders involved in territorial planning and long-
term risk management. Second, the methodology proposed
here is focused on a speciﬁc hazard caused by explosive vol-
canic eruptions (i.e., volcanic ash fallout and dispersal). But,
given that there are other hazards at both scales that poten-
tially affect the exposed targets, outcomes of our vulnera-
bility and impact assessment could support multi-risk initia-
tives and be interfaced with speciﬁc analyses. For these rea-
sons, we base our methodology on an integrated framework
for vulnerability assessment proposed within the European
project ENSURE (Menoni et al., 2012). At the European
scale, this work may contribute to a multi-risk assessment
including other hazards for aviation, such as volcanogenic
SO2 or mineral dust. At the national scale, volcanic erup-
tions are the hazardous phenomenon that poses the higher
threat to societies by means of many hazardous phenomena
such as lava ﬂow and jökulhaups (glacial outburst ﬂoods).
In particular, in 1996 and 2011, jökulhaups in southern Ice-
land destroyed parts of Route 1 (main Ring Road) and two
bridges. It is worth noting that these events usually happen
at the very local scale, while ash fallout and dispersal have
a wider spatial range. For these events to be analyzed in a
multi-risk framework, eruptive scenarios should be modiﬁed
and/or complemented in order to include these events. Fur-
ther work is therefore required in this ﬁeld and may enhance
the integration of our results in a multi-risk framework.
6 Conclusions
This work represents the ﬁrst example of a strategy that can
be applied to various volcanic settings for the multi-scale im-
pact assessment for tephra dispersal and deposition. The out-
comes of such a strategy are designed to support decision
making at both the national and the European scale. In par-
ticular, impact maps could improve preparedness and help
develop risk mitigation actions in Iceland and support long-
term risk management plans of companies that operate in the
European airspace (e.g., SRA). Based on our analysis of the
economic system at the national level and of critical airports,
FIRs and air trafﬁc routes at the European scale, we can draw
the following conclusions:
At the national scale:
– In the case of an 1875-type OES occurring at Askja, the
electricity network has a 10% probability of being im-
pacted for 700km. The occurrence of LLERS at Katla
and a 1947-type ERS at Hekla have a 10% probabil-
ity of impacting more than 250km of the national elec-
tricity network. Finally, the occurrence of a 2010-type
LLOES at Eyjafjallajökull has a 10% probability of dis-
rupting 122km of the electricity network.
– In the case of a 1947-type ERS occurring at Hekla, ﬁve
power plants have a 10% probability of being affected
by ash fallout. If selected scenarios at Askja or Katla
were to happen, four power plants would have a 10%
probability of being affected by ash fallout, while other
eruptive scenarios (2000 type at Hekla and 2010 type at
Eyjafjallajökull have a low, but not null, probability of
having impacts on power plants.
– In the case of any of the selected eruptive scenarios oc-
curring, 1–10km2 of Icelandic croplands have a 10%
probability of being affected by ash fallout. Occurrence
of eruptive scenarios at Askja and Katla have a 10%
probability of affecting 287 and 125km2 of pasture
lands, respectively.
At the European scale:
– The occurrence of a 2000-type ERS at Hekla is likely
to have very high impacts on the Reykjavík FIR (950
passengers stranded for at least 5h) and high impacts
for the London FIR (∼ 23000 passengers stranded for
at least 3h).
– The occurrence of a 1947-type ERS at Hekla is likely to
have very high impacts on the Reykjavík FIR (∼ 1500
passengersstrandedforatleast8h)andhighimpactsfor
the London FIR (∼ 27000 passengers stranded for at
least 4h). The FIR of Paris, Brest and Marseille would
also be strongly impacted.
– The occurrence of an 1875-type OES at Askja is likely
tohaveveryhighimpactsontheReykjavíkFIR(∼3600
passengers stranded for at least 18h) and high impacts
for the London FIR (∼60000 passengers stranded for
at least 8h). FIRs above France, Germany and Scandi-
navia would also be impacted.
– The occurrence of an LLERS scenario at Katla is
likely to have a very high impact on the Reykjavík
FIR (∼4300 passengers stranded for at least 21h) and
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high impact for the London FIR (∼ 78000 passen-
gers stranded for at least 10h). It is also likely that
FIRs above France, Germany and Scandinavia would be
strongly impacted.
The Supplement related to this article is available online
at doi:10.5194/nhess-14-2289-2014-supplement.
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